Applying the Iraqi Surge Strategy to Afghanistan
Consequences of President Obama Escalating the Afghan Conflict
Jan 9, 2009
With various factors in Iraq resulting in less American casualties – if not in better living conditions and security for ordinary Iraqis – more attention has been given to Afghanistan. Much credit is given to the troop surge in somewhat stabilizing Iraq and now US military leaders – as well as president-elect Barack Obama – want to apply this strategy as a solution to the war in Afghanistan.
The Myths of the Surge's Success
There are big misconceptions about the real effects of the surge in pacifying Iraq. First, more than just the presence of more US troops, the main reason for the diminished violence in Baghdad was simply that there were no more mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods to be cleansed. Sunni militias had already either killed or expelled every Shiite in the neighborhoods they controlled and Shiite militias had already did the same thing with Sunnis where they were in control.
Actually, the surge may have deepened sectarian tensions even more by dividing neighborhoods with blast walls and continuing support for an Iraqi government divided on sectarian lines which could have long-term consequences.
Secondly, while much attention has been given to the arming of Sunni Arab tribes to fight al-Qaeda, Iran's role in restraining Shiite factions and Syria's effective patrol of its border have been undervalued in decreasing the level of violence in American-occupied Iraq. Also, the risk of US-armed Sunnis turning against Shiites and Kurds in the future – thus plunging the country into civil war – is still high and does not seem to be taken into account by US policymakers.
Thirdly, the surge seems to have moved the problem of militancy out of Iraq and into the wider region. Lebanon and Syria, the former main entry points for foreign fighters into Iraq are now stuck with a number of radicalized militants who cannot cross to Iraq, either due to the closing of the border or the disruption of their networks in Iraq. Recent terrorist attacks in Syria and violence in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon could be examples of the surge's fallout in the region. Jordan, with its hight number of Iraqi refugees and its support for US policies in the region could also be hit by Iraqi-trained militants in the near future.
Afghan Realities
Applying this “surge” strategy in Afghanistan while ignoring not only its real consequences in Iraq, but also the huge differences between the two countries, is fraught with danger. First, the population's alienation and growing sympathies for the Taliban are in large part due to the very high civilian casualty rate of US-NATO operations in Afghanistan. Doubling the number of troops poses the risk of more civilian deaths and more alienation as well as adding to the sentiment that foreign troops are in fact an occupying force.
As for applying the second element of the surge – arming former insurgents – it poses its own serious risks. Afghan Pashtuns – who form the essential part of the insurgency – are not a minority like Sunni Arabs in Iraq. They are the largest of Afghan ethnic groups and organizing Pashtun tribes into militias independent from the central government is sure to recall memories of the civil war. It will surely make Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras very uncomfortable and could push them to turn to their former sponsors, which were Iran, Russia and India. Thus bringing Afghanistan back to the late 1990s.
What this means is that escalating the war in Afghanistan undermines the very process of intra-Afghan reconciliation – attempting to address each group's historic grievances and concerns – that is key to pacifying and stabilizing the country on the long-term. There is also the question of excluded regional powers like China, Iran and Russia that are becoming more and more impatient with US-NATO failures in Afghanistan and given there historic support for Tajiks as well as current support to the Karzai regime, could be expected to react very strongly against arming autonomous Pashtun militias.
Regional Conflict Escalation
In other words, the longer the war goes on without addressing regional concerns, the more likely Afghanistan will become a theater of a new Great Game between NATO and a consolidating Beijing-Moscow-Tehran axis in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A proxy war between India and Pakistan can also be expected.
As for Pakistan, the longer Washington – unable to find a solution to the war in neighboring Afghanistan – pressures Islamabad to support highly unpopular US policies and fight its own citizens in its Pashtun heartland, the greater the risk that the country falls over the brink of absolute failed-statehood, which could inflame the whole region from India to Central Asia.
Since a troop surge strategy brings high risks both internally and regionally, a non-military solution to the Afghan conflict as an alternative to war escalation should take those two elements into account.
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