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The Petraeus Strategy in AfghanistanCountering Insurgency in Two Theaters of WarAs General Petraeus assumes control of Central Command, his responsibility will expand from an Iraq focus to include the fight against a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan.
It is no secret that the security situation in Afghanistan has been rapidly deteriorating for months, even as conditions in Iraq, the other primary theater in the global war on terror, have continued to improve. General David Petraeus, widely acknowledged as the man responsible for the turn around in Iraq, is facing high expectations next month when he takes charge of the war effort in Afghanistan. Architect of a New StrategyWhen President Bush ordered a surge of American forces into Iraq early last year, General Petraeus simultaneously ordered a change in strategy for combating an increasingly violent insurgency. He moved more American troops off of their large bases and into small outposts in the cities and towns where they could be closer to the Iraqi population. He changed the focus of counterinsurgency operations from seeking out and killing the enemy to securing the population, making them feel safe in their neighborhoods and building trust. His efforts are credited with fostering cooperation among Sunni insurgents and the Shiite-led government in Baghdad, as well as an increase in information provided by local Iraqis. Shifting to a New TheaterAs Petraeus takes the helm at Central Command, expanding his responsibility to include the war in Afghanistan, many observers are wondering whether the strategy he implemented in Iraq will have similar success in fighting the Taliban and remnants of al Qaeda. Petraeus is likely to have an immediate impact on the fight in Afghanistan. As the lead author of the Army’s latest counterinsurgency doctrine, he is widely considered America’s foremost authority on fighting guerilla wars. He will, however, face considerable obstacles in bringing down the violence in Afghanistan unless he can devise a strategy that more effectively deals with the troubled tribal areas along the border with Pakistan. The U.S. government has been steadily increasing political pressure on the Pakistani government, and Islamabad has taken some moderate measures to bring the lawless areas on the Pakistani side of the border under control. Additionally, the U.S. has become more aggressive in targeting radical elements on Pakistani soil with cruise missile attacks and artillery strikes. Another factor that will have to be dealt with by Petraeus is the increasing number of radical Islamists making their way to Afghanistan through Iran, as indications continue to point to a shift in priorities for al Qaeda away from Iraq. While Iran was in no way friendly with the Taliban or Osama bin Laden, Tehran has done little thus far to stem the flow of radical Islamic fighters through its territory on the way to Afghanistan. General Petraeus will have his hands full trying to manage two active theaters of war, and while violence in Iraq has decreased, Baghdad’s troubles are far from over. At the same time, the new head of Central Command will have to find a way to effectively deal with a resurgent Taliban and a continually deteriorating situation in Afghanistan.
The copyright of the article The Petraeus Strategy in Afghanistan in Afghanistan is owned by Greg Reeson. Permission to republish The Petraeus Strategy in Afghanistan in print or online must be granted by the author in writing.
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