Understanding Who Are the Taliban
The Many Faces of Insurgency and Militancy in Afghanistan-Pakistan
Jan 13, 2009
International media as well as US and NATO forces often blame any act of violence in Afghanistan on some kind of monolithic, shadowy, centralized force called “the Taliban” which allegedly has indisputable links to al-Qaeda.
In reality, the Afghan insurgency is a mix of several factions and groups, which includes nationalists and Islamists, educated urban students and poor illiterate farmers, young new fighters and veteran anti-Soviet militants, through which also operate bands of lowly criminals and bandits. Moreover, not all those elements have direct relations or even sympathies with al-Qaeda. In fact, the only objective that unify all there groups is to force Western troops to leave Afghanistan.
Five main factions could be identified, none of them wholly unified, that operate in Afghanistan or on the Afghan-Pakistan border.
The Nationalist Taliban
Those sometimes called the nationalist Taliban form the core of the insurgency and follow the orders of field commanders that pledge allegiance to Mullah Omar.
During Taliban rule, the regime's biggest mistake was to try to bypass traditional tribal power structures. Thus, after the 2001 US invasion, tribal leaders turned their back on the Taliban, who had to go hide in the mountains of central and southeastern Afghanistan.
Due in part to the high level of collateral damage of US-NATO operations, three or four years later, the Taliban were invited back into numerous districts where they where again able to operate freely with the population's support. Now, the Taliban claim to have the open or tacit support of every major Pashtun tribe in the Afghanistan, including President Hamid Karzai's own Popalzai tribe, according to an interview by Asia Times Online.
Since the majority of its new generation of fighters are from a poor rural background, most have never really red the Koran and are a lot more motivated by Pashtunwali, the ancestral Pashtun code of honor – which predates their conversion to Islam – than by Islamist or Salafist ideology. In general, they have very limited relations with foreign al-Qaeda elements in Pakistan's tribal areas. What they want is to oust Western troops and repair perceived injustice towards Pashtuns and their under-representation in the Kabul government.
The Hezb-e-Islami
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami was one of the main anti-Soviet Mujahideen groups in the 1980s. After being dropped by his Pakistani backers, Hekmatyar fled to Iran in 1996, before coming back to fight alongside the Taliban in 2002. HI's members are more educated than the average Taliban – and are also more influence by Islamist ideology – and maintains a significant influence in the university campuses of Kabul and other major cities.
Being an ideological movement, the HI has more than just nationalist goals for Afghanistan once the war is over. Therefore, tensions between Hekmatyar and Mullah Omar – for now nominal allies – could possibly surface when the time to reenter Kabul finally comes.
The Haqqani Network
Former anti-Soviet commander and CIA asset Jalaluddin Haqqani joined the insurgency in 2006 when he was named military commander of the Afghan insurgency by Mullah Omar. He had held a minor post in the Taliban government and just before the 2001 invasion, he refused an offer – delivered by the CIA through the Pakistani ISI – to become the new Afghan President.
Haqqani is credited with introducing suicide bombing into Afghanistan. His network maintains close links with al-Qaeda and more foreign militants – mostly Arab and Pakistani – fight with Haqqani than with any other Afghan insurgency faction. However, Haqqani is also Pakistan's main asset in Afghanistan and does not support militancy against Islamabad. He has lately found himself in a delicate balancing act between his loyalty to his former Pakistani backers and his relations with al-Qaeda members advocating war on the Pakistani government.
The Pakistani Taliban
The “Pakistani Taliban” movement or Tehrik-e-Taliban emerged in 2007 with Baitullah Mehsud as its leader. It opposes the Pakistani establishment because of its support to the United States' “war on terror”. Resentment began in 2003 when Washington began pressuring the Pakistani army to crack down on militants in the autonomous tribal areas. The TeT has very close links to al-Qaeda.
The Other Pakistani Taliban
The so-called “Local Taliban” are Pakistanis that are opposed to the Tehrik-e-Taliban and avoid fighting the Pakistani army. They have clashed several times with anti-Pakistan Arab and Uzbek militants in the tribal areas. They pledge a nominal allegiance to Mullah Omar while being loyal to the Pakistani state. Several of its members are former militants that came from Kashmir after Lashka-e-Toiba training camps were closed in 2004. Unlike the TeT, they advocate making the insurgency in Afghanistan a top priority. They have close links with the Haqqani network and provide him with Pakistani fighters.
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